Types. by Fried, Charles
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Charles Fried* 
The doctrines elaborating the many provisions of the Consti-
tution and its amendments show certain similarities. For in-
stance, government action must submit to three levels of scrutiny: 
strict, intermediate, and rational basis; its goals are categorized as 
compelling, important, or merely legitimate; and the connection 
between these goals and the means of their attainment may be 
more or less tight-"narrowly tailored" is a term frequently used. 
These elements are combined and recombined, modified, and 
elaborated in doctrines about subjects as different as the separa-
tion of powers, the impingement of local regulation on the na-
tional economy, the treatment of racial minorities, freedom of 
expression, and the taking of property for public use. The tripar-
tite terminology of scrutiny is only one of the most obviously re-
curring features in our doctrinal formulations. In this article I 
consider another recurring feature of constitutional doctrine: that 
designated by the dichotomy between an effects test and an in-
tents test. I discuss why there is such a dichotomy, what its terms 
mean, and the difficulties in giving it analytic and operational 
force, and suggest that a third term, what I call an acts test, 
should be added to it. Having adverted to the levels of scrutiny 
throughout my account and related it to them, I then briefly sug-
gest how this trichotomy relates to some other recurring features 
of constitutional doctrine: the distinction between constitutional 
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doctrines that state general aspirations, those that set up institu-
tions and those that limit-either by prohibition or positive re-
quirements-the exercises of power by the institutions and 
persons designated by the constitution to fulfill certain roles; un-
constitutional condition; and the role of analogy in the state-
ments and development of doctrine. Although at the outset it 
may seem that I am offering no more than a scheme of classifica-
tion, by the end of this essay I hope it will be clear that there is 
more to it than that. The brief discussion of analogy, unconstitu-
tional conditions, and aspirational, institutional, and limiting pro-
visions is intended to indicate the kind of influence the 
trichotomy I elaborate exerts on the substance of constitutional 
doctrine. Only at the conclusion do I make this point explicit. 
The dichotomy (which becomes a trichotomy in my analysis) ap-
plies most naturally to limiting provisions, and I shall show why 
that should be. At this point I state only that limiting provisions 
seem to be at the heart of lawyers', and perhaps even the pub-
lic's, conception of what constitutional law is really about, and 
move directly into mapping the dichotomy/trichotomy onto this 
type of constitutional provision. 
I. INTENTS, EFFECTS, ACTS 
Provisions limiting official exercises of authority are positive 
or negative, that is, they require either that one do, aim at, or 
achieve what is mandated, or avoid doing, aiming at, or achieving 
the thing forbidden. The great divide in this domain of constitu-
tional limits, whether positive or negative, is said to be between 
provisions that doctrine elaborates as speaking to forbidden or 
required purposes or goals of official action (intents tests) and 
forbidden or required results of those actions (effects tests). So, 
for instance, it is said that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids 
only those governmental actions that are intended to deprive per-
sons of equal protection of the laws on some forbidden basis.l 
By contrast, from the 1963 decision in Sherbert v. Verner2 until 
Oregon v. Smith3 in 1990, the Free Exercise clause of the First 
Amendment was generally interpreted to forbid governmental 
action that had the effect of making religious practice more bur-
densome for the individual. But as we shall see there is some-
thing unsatisfactory about both of these analytical categories, at 
least if they are taken to exhaust the field. On the one hand, a 
1. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
2. 374 u.s. 398 (1963). 
3. 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
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focus on intent produces considerable complications in divining 
and assigning purposes to corporate entities. On the other hand, 
a focus on effects threatens to introduce a virtually unbounded 
judicial inquiry that is unconcerned with notions of moral agency. 
A. EFFECfS 
Effects tests may seem to have a certain natural primacy: the 
law is a practical instrument, and effects designate the states of 
the world with which the law is concerned. But this is a mistake. 
Giving effects primacy commits constitutional law to a disputed 
vision of the state's function and of its proper form of interven-
tion in human affairs. In many circumstances and for many rea-
sons how an effect is produced may be of such significance that it 
overcomes any argument stated in terms of the effect alone. This 
is true in our personal morality and it is true for governments as 
well. There is another reason of a more practical order why the 
law generally, and constitutional doctrine in particular, often 
avoids effects tests: laws and doctrines stated in terms of effects 
risk asking too much, and so introduce an indeterminacy that in-
vites a kind of balancing that itself has serious disadvantages. 
Balancing is entailed by effects tests because as a logical 
matter most courses of action have some tendency to contribute 
to a forbidden effect-or to undermine the pursuit of a required 
effect. The case in which the Supreme Court first emphasized 
this inconvenience, Jefferson v. Hackney,4 illustrates the problem. 
The state chose to pay more generous welfare benefits to blind 
and other physically disabled persons than to families in need of 
financial assistance because of poverty (AFDC), a category 
which contained a far higher proportion of African-Americans. 
This choice thus had the effect of disadvantaging an identifiable 
racial group. But the same might be said about a large range of 
social programs, particularly when such programs are viewed to-
gether. Similarly, if the reasoning of Sherbert v. Verner,s subject-
ing to strict scrutiny (and thus imposing a very heavy burden of 
justification) a particular government program that had the effect 
of making the exercise of some individual's religion more diffi-
cult, were extended and generalized, any government program-
whether an income tax (say, on the salary of a minister), a sales 
tax, or compulsory military service-that made religious practice 
even slightly more burdensome would fall under the Constitu-
tion's ban. So, even when the limit is important enough to attract 
4. 406 u.s. 535 (1972). 
5. 374 u.s. 398 (1963). 
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heightened scrutiny, whether strict or intermediate (rational ba-
sis scrutiny assumes balancing and allows almost any outcome to 
stand6), an effects test must be cabined or qualified somehow: 
either by some categorical rule that puts certain effects out of 
consideration or makes others determinative, or by a balancing 
test that allows the forbidden effect to be outweighed by the 
good that the questioned measure accomplishes. For this reason, 
effects tests intersect importantly with doctrines assigning levels 
of scrutiny to be applied to questioned actions. If a norm is 
stated in terms of a forbidden effect and that effect may only be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest, then such a norm 
will harshly limit governmental behavior in surprising and inde-
terminate ways. As I shall argue, that is why effects tests are 
more likely encountered in conjunction with lower levels of scru-
tiny, where the balancing is more permissive; strict scrutiny is 
more usually associated with intents tests. 
The balancing approach entails the inconvenience that the 
judges doing the balancing must assume a large and amorphous 
power to scan and evaluate all the decisions of government.7 Un-
less the balancing is a sham and almost any plausible invocation 
of a government interest is found sufficient, a court that balances 
assumes, in effect, the quintessential exercise of public judgment. 
And so doctrines elaborating these limits on government gener-
ally seek more categorical boundaries for such provisions. The 
most eligible has seemed to be to move from effects to purpose 
as the focus of doctrine, and this is what the Supreme Court did 
in Jeffersons and Washington v. Davis.9 In this way, though gov-
ernment produces a variety of effects, only those that are a part 
of its purpose in acting are relevant to the question whether a 
limit has been transgressed. This distinction corresponds to the 
distinction in tort law between harms negligently and intention-
ally produced. Negligence requires a judgment that an effect not 
only was brought about, but that it was brought about unreason-
ably-that is, that the burden of avoidance was not too great rel-
ative to the harm to be avoided. And this is a conclusion that 
6. In its purest form rational basis balancing simply accepts the determination of 
the other organs of government, unless they are so anomalous and unreasonable as not to 
be within the realm of institutional functioning at all. See James B. Thayer, The Origin 
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893). 
7. See, e.g., Mo"ison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711-12 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 426 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disapproving of 
the Court engaging in a sweeping case-by-case analysis to determine "how much is too 
much" in the commingling of functions among the branches). 
8. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). 
9. 426 u.s. 229 (1976). 
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requires a judgment not only on the badness of the harm to be 
avoided, but implicitly on the value of all the ends that intersect 
with that harm and the pursuit of which may to a greater or lesser 
degree increase the risk of the harm coming about.lo An intents 
test, such as the designation of wrongful purpose in serious 
crimes, requires no such global judgment, only the discrete judg-
ment that of all ends an actor might pursue, this is one (e.g., to 
assault another) that is ineligible and disallowed. Doctrinal elab-
oration then takes the form of specified exceptions to such rules: 
for instance, self-defense or punishment as justifying what would 
otherwise be an assault. So also in constitutional law otherwise 
prohibited purposes may be pursued in specified circumstances.ll 
Positive limits-i.e. requirements-have a different logic. It 
makes sense to direct that government may not pursue a certain 
end, or that a certain purpose may not be invoked to justify bad 
consequences, but to require either the pursuit of a certain end or 
the production a certain result, without explaining how large an 
effort must be made or at what sacrifice of competing goals, is 
always unsatisfactory. 
Despite the general tendency of doctrines, positive and neg-
ative, to make excessive claims when stated in terms of effects, 
there are many occasions on which laws and constitutional doc-
trine are quite naturally and appropriately stated in terms of ef-
fects: whenever the ensuing balancing will not tend to be too 
open-ended and all-encompassing, because surrounding doc-
trines will discipline and confine, explicitly or implicitly, its range. 
Examples are the prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizure and excessive bail and the requirement that a person ac-
cused of crime be tried speedily. Because of the focused and lim-
ited nature of what is at stake there is little danger that the 
balancing these provisions invite will draw the whole universe of 
concerns into account. Similarly, as we shall see, balancing tests 
as concomitants of effects tests appear at the margins of other, 
harder-edged doctrines to soften them and make them more ac-
commodating to circumstances. 
B. INTENTS 
Intents tests are the principal competitor to effects tests. It is 
to intents tests that the law has turned to avoid the inconve-
niences in effects tests. The Supreme Court, in Jefferson v. Hack-
10. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (1947) (L. Hand, J.). 
11. As when there is a compelling governmental interest. See, e.g., Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
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ney12 and Washington v. Davis,13 laid down the doctrine that 
government action does not violate the Equal Protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment unless the discrimination worked 
by that action comes about intentionally, thus avoiding the po-
tentially open-ended balancing that an effects test invites. Simi-
larly, a recent and controversial decision, Oregon v. Smith,14 
would tightly discipline the generalized balancing invited by 
Sherbert v. Vernerls in Free Exercise cases. In Smith the Court 
said that a law of general applicability that had the effect of bur-
dening a person's exercise of religion did not for that reason 
alone violate the Constitution. Rather, the Court emphasized 
that only laws that "prohibit" the free exercise of religion fall 
under the ban of the constitutional text.l6 Although the case is 
not explicit about this, the Court might very well be seen as in-
sisting on the intentionality implicit in the constitutional term 
"prohibit"-one does not prohibit something by inadvertence. 
An intents test applied to governmental action has inconve-
niences of its own. It has seemed to many commentators that 
there is something inapposite at worst, and metaphoric at best, 
about attributing intent to a collective body.11 The individuals 
making up such a body often act from a variety of motives. In-
tent is a concept drawn from the domain of individual psychol-
ogy, and no ready metric exists to quantify and combine such 
individual attributions and apply them to a collective body. 
Jones may have intended to kill Smith in shooting at his passing 
automobile, but did the legislature intend the death of tens of 
thousand of citizens when it chose to build highways rather than 
high speed rail links between major cities? A further shortcom-
ing of the intents test lies, not in the divination of intent itself, 
but in the fact that serious damage may be done though no bad 
intent can be shown. Consider again Jefferson v. Hackney1s and 
Washington v. Davis.19 Although an effects test appears to give 
courts too much scope for judgment, does not an intents test vir-
tually immunize government action from scrutiny altogether,2o 
12. 406 u.s. 535 (1972). 
13. 426 u.s. 229 (1976). 
14. 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
15. 374 u.s. 398 (1963). 
16. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. 
17. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. 
L. Rev. 204 (1980). 
18. 406 u.s. 535 (1972). 
19. 426 u.s. 229 (1976). 
20. Cf. David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 935 (1989). 
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no matter how grievously disproportionate its effects on pro-
tected rights or on a protected category of citizens might be? 
Courts have shrunk from this extreme too, as an argument that 
proves too much. Intents tests, difficult though they may be, 
have not been made impossible to meet. 1\vo criteria have been 
used to allow practical invocation of the test-both 
uncomfortable. 
First, the difficulty in assigning intent to public actors and 
corporate entities has been countered with a widely accepted 
practice. What in respect to individuals are thought to be indicia 
of intent-confessions and avowals-are sought out among the 
statements of actual persons making up a corporate body and are 
attributed to it. Just as we take an individual's statement that he 
acted from a particular motive as indicative of his intent, so when 
we find such statements in, say, the legislative record we make 
the same attribution to the body as a whole.21 
Second, the apparent excessive permissiveness of the intents 
test is mitigated by what might be called indirect evidences of 
intent, and these are less artificially extended to corporate enti-
ties, since they do not appear to posit an individual mind in the 
matter. For instance, if a course of action produces a particular 
forbidden effect as well as the effect which is urged to justify the 
conduct and to constitute its "true" intent, and this justifying ef-
fect might in fact have been produced as easily or almost as easily 
without the forbidden effect, this is taken to show that the forbid-
den result was what was aimed at after all. The actor appeared to 
go out of his way to produce the harm, while if the harm had 
occurred along a direct route to some other destination that judg-
ment of condemnation would be much less eligible. 
The law has a variety of devices that may be seen as elabo-
rating this notion in the context of institutional action. One of 
these was most dramatically deployed in 1960 in Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot,22 in which a city's purpose to disenfranchise its black 
citizens was inferred from the bizarrely redrawn city boundaries, 
which corresponded to no geographical, topological, historical, or 
social fact other than that they had the effect of excluding almost 
all black voters. What this case illustrates is a process of reason-
ing that first posits that government must be taken to have some 
purpose for its actions, that what it has done must be assumed to 
21. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); 
John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale 
L.J. 1205 (1970). 
22. 364 u.s. 339 (1960). 
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be at least approximately an attempt to achieve that purpose, and 
that sometimes it is simply not possible to propose a proper pur-
pose to which the questioned action bears any remote relation, 
while at the same time it fits the improper purpose like a glove. 
The Gomillion example serves to illustrate, in part, that effects 
come back into the intents test when the effects involved are ex-
treme in their salience. If one effect is very substantial, and the 
other effect is a peppercorn, the two tests more or less collapse 
into one another. It is in this fashion that effects become a criti-
cal piece of evidence in the determination of intent, particularly 
in those contexts in which those whose actions are constrained 
are unlikely to acknowledge candidly their illicit motivation. 
Where doctrine forbids strongly but not absolutely-as with 
racial classifications and regulations impinging on freedom of 
speech or burdening the exercise of religion-and government 
offers an appropriate justification, it is sometimes said that the 
regulation must be narrowly tailored to the justifying purpose,23 
or that the means chosen must be the least restrictive way to get 
to the justifying goal.24 
FIGURE 1 
ACTS PURPOSES EFFECTS 
POSITIVE 1 2 3 
NEGATIVE 4 5 6 
By these tests if government action has an impact on protected 
liberties-in my terminology, if it falls in cell 6 of figure 1 by 
having the effect of transgressing a limit-as for instance in the 
case of Sherbert v. Verner2s or any of a number of time, place and 
manner restrictions on speech-then a court will ask of the as-
serted justification (say, to prevent littering,26 to preserve quiet 
in residential neighborhoods,27 to compensate victims of 
crime28): could this goal have been achieved without the effect on 
the protected interest, whether it be speech, religious exercise, or 
the economic interests of competitors from beyond the borders 
23. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
24. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973). 
25. 374 u.s. 398 (1963). 
26. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
27. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
28. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105 
(1992). 
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of the regulating state? This inquiry corresponds to a common 
sense h1quiry used to tease out what an individual's real intention 
might have been. When we do not know whether a person is 
sincere in claiming that he "did not mean" to cause a particular 
harm, that he was only trying to do some other, quite innocent 
thing, we test that sincerity by asking whether he could have 
achieved his asserted goal without doing harm along the way. 
There is some controversy in the cases about whether to pass 
muster the questioned government action has to be the least re-
strictive alternative (whether the only way the government can 
attain its stated goal is by running over the complainant's rights), 
or whether it is good enough for government to show that its 
chosen route was a reasonable way to get to where it says it was 
going.z9 
Legal doctrine also reflects another common sense judg-
ment: the greater the harm one causes, the more burdensome the 
steps it is reasonable to expect a person who did not want that 
harm would take to avoid it. So if I fail to swerve to avoid a toad 
in the roadway, I might be believed when I say that I did not 
intend to kill but didn't want to run the slight risk of an accident 
by swerving, or even that I just did not want to jostle my passen-
gers. A greater effort is required to avoid hitting a dog, and, if 
the possible victim is a person, a supreme effort, before the actor 
will be believed that he really did not mean to do the running 
over, but just was trying to get from one place to another. 
Though it may seem that this analysis reintroduces an effects test 
with its concomitant balancing as the principal doctrinal form, 
this would be a mistake. What we do here is use the balance of 
consequences as evidence of intent, but not as conclusive evi-
dence, not as the equivalent of intent. 
Content neutrality in speech cases also corresponds to a nat-
ural strategy for determining an individual's true intention. If the 
Constitution forbids the purpose (cells 2 and 5 of figure 1) of 
suppressing speech, then the claim that government's purpose 
(intent) in, say, banning picketing, was not to suppress speech 
(which is an incidental effect of the ban) but to preserve the 
amenity of residential neighborhoods, the explanation is less 
plausible if the ban is directed only at some picketing, and that 
type of picketing is no more disruptive than what is permitted. 
This is because the principle of exclusion seems to depend on the 
speech content of the picketing, while the justification offered for 
29. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937 
(1989). 
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the ban does not and may not.3o In short, the justification seems 
a pretext. Such devices are modes of attributing intent while tak-
ing into account in a limited and structured way, the effects-
actual and hypothetical-of an item of behavior. 
Why do we ever care-whether in constitutional, ordinary 
legal, or even in moral contexts-what an actor's intent might 
be? One reason, mentioned by Bentham to explain the impor-
tance of intent in criminal law, notes that you may achieve a 
more narrowly targeted, less costly restraint if you focus on in-
tent. If a particular effect is likely to be produced in the larger 
proportion of cases only by those who want to produce that ef-
fect, and if it is an effect that people not seeking to produce it are 
likely to avoid-as in the case of killing-then the prohibition 
directed at intentional killing reaches much of what is needed 
and does so without sweeping in presumably neutral or useful 
conduct that only produces this result accidentally.3t 
But there is a moral dimension to this focus on intention as 
well. Though a person's values and therefore his character are 
judged by what he is willing to risk to get what he wants, still 
there is a primacy about a person's actual ends.3z There is a dif-
ference between a man who is willing to see others suffer harm as 
the price of his achieving his own ends, and one who seeks that 
harm for its own sake; and it is not just that in the latter instance 
he is more likely to produce the harm.33 Our actions and our 
goals are what define us and what determine our character, and if 
bad things are part of what we are invested in, the corruption is 
more intense and complete. And so it may be with institutions, 
as well. The limits the Constitution places on government may 
be understood not just in terms of minimizing certain sorts of 
harms, but in ruling certain goals out of bounds for government 
altogether. The furtherance or suppression of religion, for in-
stance, are simply not part of what government may aim at all.34 
Viewed in this light, some prohibitions on government (the limits 
I have assigned to cell 5 of figure 1) speak most naturally to in-
tentions, were it not for the inconvenience that intention is a con-
cept so anthropomorphic that its application to artificial, 
corporate, plurally constituted bodies seems at once inapposite 
30. Compare Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) with Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 
(1988) and Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
31. See Charles Fried, Right and Wrong • Preliminary Considerations, 5 1. Legal 
Stud. 165 (1976). 
32. See Charles Fried, Right and Wrong 7-29 (Harvard U. Press, 1978). 
33. See Fried, 5 J. Legal Stud. 165 (cited in note 31). 
34. See Tribe, 1993 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 (cited in note *). 
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and inevitable. Might not this inconvenience be avoided by ac-
knowledging that just as with an individual so with a corporate 
body, its actions, if they are rational, serve a purpose? When a 
controversy arises about whether the action is proper the corpo-
rate body, like an individual, may seek to justify itself in terms of 
its purpose, and then the action is judged according to whether 
that now-stated purpose might not have been achieved other-
wise, at lesser cost to competing values. 
The difficulty about attributing intention to a governmental 
entity appears in a different light when we take into account that 
such entities are fundamentally and inescapably constituted. Any 
proposition appropriately attributing a statement, an action, an 
intention or other mental state, quality or condition to such an 
entity must be mediated by the rules that relate to its make-up 
and way of proceeding. These rules are what constitute such bod-
ies as distinct entities and appropriate subjects of any proposition 
at all. So unless we take an extreme stance by which Congress or 
the Presidency or a court are simply short-hand terms which in a 
fully accurate proposition would be unpacked in terms only of 
natural persons and their doings, we should not be especially re-
luctant to attribute intention to these constituted entities. Con-
sider the members of Congress assembled for a picnic on a very 
hot Fourth of July. We would hesitate a long time before saying 
that the Congress perspired heavily-as we would not about say-
ing that the House resolved to adjourn or to proclaim its appreci-
ation of some act of heroism. That is because sweating is not the 
kind of thing parliamentary bodies do: the rules constituting 
them do not provide for this mode of action and offer no criteria 
for such attributions. What constitutes a quorum for sweating; 
would a simple majority suffice? 
The doctrines about intention that the courts have elabo-
rated-least restrictive alternatives, content-neutrality, the rele-
vance of certain statements by certain persons-are just such 
rules of attribution. Indeed this is shown even in the case of the 
actions of a unitary official actor-a judge, the head of a depart-
ment, or the President. Even then the attribution of intention to 
such an actor, as when we speak of the intention of the official's 
regulation, or the intention of his directive, or of the intention of 
whatever other official action is in issue, depends on certain rules 
having been complied with, procedures followed. Indeed subjec-
tive intention comes most clearly to the fore only in anomalous 
and degenerate cases-as when there is an issue about whether 
the official acted for corrupt or illicit motives outside the scope of 
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his official function altogether. The powers of institutions, even 
institutions headed by a single individual, derive not from the 
persons who inhabit them but from the legal and constitutional 
provisions that create them, and so it is this constituted, institu-
tional efficacy that concerns us in a "government of laws and not 
of men".3s (Compare the situation in a despotism or in a crimi-
nal gang, where the subjective disposition of the potent individ-
ual looms very large indeed.) 
We attribute acts, purposes, statements, and sentiments to 
such constituted bodies, because constituted though they are, 
they are nonetheless constituted by human beings and of human 
beings. And so constitutional doctrine, which judges the conduct 
of government, quite appropriately speaks in terms of such attri-
butions-indeed much of constitutional doctrine is precisely 
about when a particular attribution is appropriate. I have al-
ready indicated the slide towards global balancing by the judici-
ary that a focus just on the effects of government action entails. 
In addition, however, we can now see that such an exclusive con-
cern for results makes official action more like a natural event (a 
hurricane or epidemic) and less like a purposive human act. So 
the danger is that intention tends to make our concerns personal 
in a way that is inappropriate to a constituted republic of laws, 
while an exclusive concern for results turns us too far away from 
the fact that the institutions we obey are, after all, human institu-
tions designed to further human ends. An appropriate doctrinal 
response must somehow, and in spite of the difficulties, take into 
account the purposive (intentional) nature of official conduct: the 
Supreme Court is not devising responses to floods, disease, or 
tigers. 
C. Acrs 
If constitutional doctrine could be interrogated and we were 
to ask of it what in general are the kinds of things that the Con-
stitution requires or prohibits, the standard answer implicit in 
most doctrinal expositions would be outcomes (effects) or pur-
poses (intents). But if we step away from standard statements of 
doctrines and consider what the Constitution does, then a third 
object of limiting doctrines becomes apparent. Many limiting 
provisions speak neither to effects nor to intents but quite simply 
and directly require or prohibit particular acts. (Cells 1 and 4 of 
figure 1 ). It seems truer to the facts not only to recognize this 
third category of limiting provisions, but indeed to recognize that 
35. Mass. Const., Art. XXX. 
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in their simplicity and directness such limitations have a certain 
primacy. 
I suggest that sometimes the best way to see what the Con-
stitution tells us is as a direction Do or Don't Do This. The dis-
tinctiveness of the act category is clearest in respect to 
mandatory acts (celll). When the Constitution directs the Presi-
dent to deliver an annual address to the Congress on the state of 
the union,36 the norm is not complied with merely by his in-
tending to do so, and of course since it is not his address unless 
he does so intentionally, the idea of achieving the result inadver-
tently cannot arise. The same is true of the oath required of all 
officers of government to support the Constitution.37 Numerous 
provisions enjoin, as a condition of exercising a power, particular 
acts-and can only be satisfied by the doing of just those acts, not 
be a mere intention to do them, and not by some other act that 
may have a similar effect. These are among some of the most 
potent and constraining limits on government power for just that 
reason. If a person is to be tried, then there must be a certain 
kind of trial-not just a good faith intent to have such a trial, nor 
even something that may have the same effect, whatever that 
may be-but a trial by jury,3s following a grand jury indictment 
in the case of a felony,39 and with confrontation of prosecution 
witnesses and assistance of counsel.4o 
As an example of a purely prohibitory limit expressed in 
terms of acts (cell 4), consider the injunction against religious 
tests in Article VI, clause 3 of the Constitution. A statute requir-
ing official attendance at an annual religious ceremony might 
have as its purpose to embarrass and thus discourage officehold-
ing by those who do not share that religious observance. It might 
have been intended only to honor some national hero but yet 
have this discouraging effect. I would suggest that rather than 
asking whether the statute belongs in column I or column E, the 
question might best be put: what did Congress do? The statute 
would then be seen as a text which the country is asked to inter-
pret. So the question is: Did Congress enact a religious test? 
What did Congress do, not what is the effect of what Congress 
did? As we shall see, this category of forbidden acts fits one un-
derstanding of the First Amendment's Establishment clause, 
where the test proposes: has government endorsed religion by its 
36. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3. 
37. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 3. 
38. U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
39. U.S. Const., Amend. V. 
40. U.S. Const., Amend. VI. 
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action? So also it has been proposed to solve the conundrum 
posed by such assertedly even-handed statutes as those forbid-
ding interracial marriage or integrated public facilities. Are they 
not best understood as a racial insult? 
I return now to the subject of norms imposing constitutional 
limits. My suggestion after this detour is that there is a third al-
ternative, along with effects and intents: required or forbidden 
acts (cells 1 and 4). I do not mean to suggest that cells 2, 5, 3, and 
6 (intentions and effects) represent empty sets. My suggestion, 
rather, is that the category of Acts (cells 1 and 4) has a certain 
primacy, the category of acts being more primitive, more basic, 
while the other two are more sophisticated and therefore per-
haps more derivative and problematic. Action is a primitive con-
ception of human efficacy, representing the union of intention 
and effect. By contrast, we tend to speak of intention alone when 
the outward manifestation may have departed from the inten-
tion, or the intention has not manifested itself at all. With effects 
the abstraction runs in the other direction. We have prised out-
ward events off of the paradigmatic form of human agency that 
brings them about, so that it is not surprising that we are left with 
far too broad, too unfocused, too inhuman an array of natural 
circumstances, and it is necessary to fashion devices to limit and 
make manageable this array. 
An analogy to textual meaning may make this clearer. 
When we recognize a constitutional norm as directed to an act, 
this is analogous to our attending not to what a legislature might 
have meant (intended) by a certain statute, nor yet how some 
addressees of it might understand it (its effect), but simply to 
what the text says. When a person produces a text, it is also pos-
sible to focus on some private mental element of that (utterance) 
act, or on how that text is understood by those whom it reaches. 
The first focus corresponds to an intents test of meaning, the sec-
ond to an effects test. Both approaches may be appropriate, but 
they must take their place beside an emphasis which asks simply: 
what has the man said; what has he done?41 
II. EXAMPLES 
The actual doctrines that fill the pages of the reports-with 
their three- and four-part tests, parts which sometimes ramify 
into two or more "prongs"-combine and recombine the ele-
41. See Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers' Intent, 100 
Harv. L. Rev. 751 (1987). 
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ments of acts, intents, and effects in more or less complexly struc-
tured ways. Here is an example: 
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has 
developed. At the outset, we must determine whether the ex-
pression is protected by the First Amendment. For commer-
cial speech to come within that provision, it at least must 
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask 
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If 
both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine 
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental in-
terest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest. Central Hudson Gas & Elec-
tric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.42 
And another simpler one: 
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not 
absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are 
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention and punishment of which have never been 
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include 
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insult-
ing or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance 
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.43 
What these instances show are various combinations of the 
argument types I have schematized. Justice Murphy in Chaplin-
sky points to types of actions: the lewd and obscene, and "fight-
ing words" whose utterance government may prevent and 
punish. The act is the act of punishment, but it is a nested act: 
the act of punishing the act of speaking insulting or lewd words. 
There is a picture about a picture. All this fits, though intricately, 
into cell4. But notice the next step Justice Murphy takes-a per-
fectly easy and natural one. He identifies these words in terms of 
their further qualities: they insult, they tend to incite trouble. So 
Justice Murphy at first identifies an act (lewd speaking), but the 
description requires interpretation and elaboration, and he sup-
plies that first of all in terms of another picture, another act, one 
person insulting another. So we have doctrine which moves from 
42. 447 u.s. 557, 566 (1980). 
43. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571·72 (1942). 
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one description (lewd words) to another (insults). Nor is it clear 
which description is the more general; it is not as if Murphy in 
this move were going from a less to a more abstract description 
of the proscribable act. Rather he is giving us two intersecting 
general descriptions, and the area of concern is at the overlap. 
But in the latter part of the same sentence he specifies his mean-
ing (his doctrine) in terms of effects: a tendency to incite immedi-
ate breaches of the peace. Now the abstractness of this effects 
language makes doctrines in column E appear somehow ulti-
mate, so that we are tempted to think that the best formulated 
doctrine is one formulated in this way. So all speech is proscrib-
able that has this effect. But this is a mistake. The pros-
cribability of the speech in terms of the effect (a breach of the 
peace) depends in part on the ways the effect is thought to be 
brought about (by insults), for if a breach of the peace is brought 
about in some other way-say, by the measured, respectful 
preaching of a doctrine that provokes a hostile audience-the 
doctrine (or doctrine fragment) would not apply, and the speech 
could not on that account be punished.44 This is particularly evi-
dent in the interpretive phrase "by their very utterance inflict in-
jury." The injury is indeed an effect of the words, but the 
doctrine requires a proximity of cause to effect that interprets 
both. 
The four part Central Hudson test also shows how a doctrine 
can be compounded of elements from all three columns: acts, in-
tents, and effects. The first part has two prongs: an act prong 
(speaking about a lawful activity), and an effects prong (not hav-
ing the effect of being misleading-whatever the speaker's in-
tent, one would suppose). The second part again describes a 
kind of act-the assertion of a governmental interest that can be 
taken as substantial. This assertion, however, is only an element 
in the complex tests stated in the third and fourth parts. The 
asserted interest in the third part becomes an end-point or effect, 
which the regulation must directly advance. Here the effect in an 
effects test is not stated by the Constitution (as in the case of the 
effect of burdening the exercise of religion) but is proposed by 
the government and judged by the Constitution in part two. The 
requirement, moreover, that the effect be advanced directly calls 
to mind not just a means-end relationship, but one having a par-
ticular character (directness), which is more a descriptive than an 
analytic term and as such belongs more to the description of 
kinds of acts: those that produce their effects directly. And di-
44. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
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rectness in producing a result is a sign of an intent to produce it; 
unintended effects are rarely produced directly. The fourth part 
of the Central Hudson test combines these elements yet more 
intricately: the whole universe of possible means-ends relations 
of the kind posited in part three must be scanned to determine if 
there may be among them one in which the effect of restricting 
speech is less than in the subject regulation. But as I have sug-
gested, this least restrictive alternative test is a way of testing the 
intention with which government acts. (Any complete account of 
these particular doctrines would show how they may have begun 
life as displaying one or another of these doctrine types, but 
picked up accretions drawn from the other types as the pressure 
of new applications required either qualification or limited 
expansion. )45 
A final set of related examples: The ex post facto clauses,46 
the double jeopardy clause47 and the due process clause4s pro-
hibit retroactive punishment, a second prosecution or punish-
ment for the same act, and the imposition of punishment except 
by the process set out in the Bill of Rights (specifically the Fifth, 
Sixth and Eighth Amendments). Yet retroactive laws with harsh 
consequences and the imposition of fresh consequences on trans-
actions already completed are not in general prohibited.49 And 
specific procedural protections, such as indictment by grand jury 
and trial by petit jury or the requirement of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt,so are not generally accorded even to persons who 
may suffer dire consequences-e.g., deportation, loss of prop-
erty, even loss of liberty-as a result of a law or proceeding. 
Whether these stringent, constitutionally mandated protections 
and prohibitions obtain depends on whether the law or proceed-
ing is designated on the one hand as penal, punitive or involving 
the imposition of punishment, or on the other as (merely) regula-
tory or remedial. Laws imposing civil forfeitures of property im-
plicated in drug offenses have been challenged as imposing 
double punishment,sl as have laws imposing disqualifications 
(e.g., from driving a motor vehicle,sz from practicing medicine, 53 
45. See generally Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1140 
(1994). 
46. U.S. Const., Art. I, §§ 9, 10. 
47. U.S. Const., Amend. V. 
48. Id. 
49. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). 
50. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
51. See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). 
52. Luk v. Commonwealth, 658 N.E.2d 664 (Mass. 1995). 
53. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898). 
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from holding office in a labor unions4) following conviction of 
offenses related to those qualifications. Laws retroactively alter-
ing procedures relating to parole have been challenged as violat-
ing the ex post facto clause.ss Laws revoking citizenship for 
remaining outside the United States to avoid military service or 
for desertion have been challenged because they did not provide 
for the protections required for criminal proceedings,s6 or im-
posed cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.s7 And laws now being enacted all over the country 
requiring registration of certain duly released sex offenders, with 
the possibility of notification to the public of their presence in 
the community, have been challenged on all of these grounds.ss 
In each of these cases the question has turned on whether the 
detriment imposed on the complaining person constitutes 
punishment. 
It is often said that the indicia of penal laws is that they are 
designed (have the purpose) to deter or to exact retributions9-
and, I would add, to express moral condemnation. Some courts 
have focused on the stated purpose of the legislation. When they 
have done so they have invariably upheld the legislation since 
legislatures regularly state a plausible regulatory goal and can 
easily avoid language of deterrence and condemnation.60 Other 
courts have spoken in terms of effects, and asked whether the 
legislation has the effect of deterring or condemning. Both tests 
have obvious defects. As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts put it in an opinion on the constitutionality of a pro-
posed statute requiring registration and community notification 
in respect to certain released sex offenders, 
An exclusive focus on either purposes or effects would be 
unreasonable and impracticable. Thus the Justices cannot 
agree with the statement ... that measures such as § 174B 
[community notification regarding released sex offenders] may 
only count as regulatory if they have no deterrent or retribu-
tive effect, for most regulatory measures will have such an ef-
fect. Depriving persons of a license to practice medicine or 
law because they have shown themselves to be incompetent or 
54. DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960). 
55. California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 115 S. Ct. 1597 (1995). 
56. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
57. Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
58. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 668 N.E.2d 738 (1996); Doe v. Po ritz, 142 N.J. 1 
(1995); Anway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996). 
59. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989); Mendoza-Martinez, 
115 S. Ct. at 168. 
60. See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147-49. 
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unreliable has a deterrent effect on others, and yet such meas-
ures are routinely counted as regulatory.6t Similarly, such 
measures may evoke retributive sentiments in the public and 
in victims of past depredations of persons to whom they are 
applied. But it would be equally extreme and impracticable to 
judge such measures solely by the avowed purposes of the 
Legislature, for it would then be too easy by the appropriate 
recitation of a regulatory or remedial purpose to undermine 
the distinctness of the criminal regime and of the constitu-
tional safeguards that distinctly characterize it. Thus even in 
Ursery, where the [Supreme] Court-in the context of a civil 
forfeiture statute judged under the double jeopardy clause-
seemed to go some distance in accepting the government's 
statement of a remedial purpose, the Court added the caveat 
that if "the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose 
or effect as to negate [the Legislature's] intention to establish 
a civil remedial mechanism," it is a punitive statute. Ursery, at 
4568. 
In approaching each of the constitutional safeguards ... , 
the Justices are governed by the overriding concern that the 
distinctiveness of the criminal justice system not be elided, lest 
we move in the direction of a regime where persons, and not 
just particular activities and occupations, are seen as regulated 
by government, rather than a regime where persons are seen 
as personally responsible for conforming their conduct to the 
clearly promulgated standards of the criminal law. Accord-
ingly, while respecting the needs of practical regulation and 
the concerns expressed by the Legislature, the Justices judge 
this bill ... by looking not just to its stated regulatory purpose, 
but also its effect on those to whom it is to be applied and on 
others, and its resemblance to other measures that have firmly 
been established to count as either regulatory or criminal. The 
more harshly the measures bear on the individual and the 
more closely they resemble traditional criminal sanctions, the 
more urgent must be the regulatory concern, the more soundly 
rooted in fact rather than prejudice and conjecture must be 
the basis for that concern, and the more closely we must insist 
that the proffered regulation must hew to the well-grounded 
regulatory aim.62 
61. The test must refer to general, not specific deterrence, since any successful 
regulatory measure, such as revoking a license to practice of an attorney who 
has shown himself to lack the appropriate judgment or character, will specifi-
cally prevent the person to whom the measure is applied from doing harm in the 
regime the measure regulates. (Footnote by the Justices to the Senate, 668 
N.E.2d 738, 750 (Mass. 1996). 
62. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 668 N.E.2d at 750. 
73 
74 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 14:55 
There are illustrated here all three argument types: The 
measures in question are designated as regulatory, because that 
is how the legislature designated them-that is, an intents test. 
But because the measures have effects that resemble those that 
are punitive in nature, that designation must be plausible, and 
the plausibility of the designation is judged by the congruence 
between the stated purpose and the likely effects. This is true in 
free speech cases too, where the plausibility of an asserted pur-
pose to regulate only conduct63 or only the time, place, and man-
ner of speaking,64 depends on the congruence between the 
asserted purpose and the effects. As in a number of other sub-
stantive areas-e.g., the takings clause,6s or the commerce 
clause,66 or the spending clause67-the degree of congruence re-
quired (other locutions refer to the closeness of the fit) in order 
to validate the stated purpose in light of its effects will vary de-
pending on the urgency accorded to the constitutional protection 
on which those effects are seen to impinge. 
But in making these determinations the Supreme Court in 
Ursery has thrown in a caveat that might seem to invoke the third 
argument type, that of acts: if "the statutory scheme [is] so puni-
tive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the Legislature's] 
intention to establish a civil remedial mechanism," it is a punitive 
statute.68 Since the tests for which this caveat acts as a backstop 
are themselves supposed to identify when a statute imposes pun-
ishment-i.e., when it is punitive-there is here an apparent cir-
cularity: A statute is either remedial or punitive; it is remedial if 
it is intended to be remedial, unless it is so punitive that it is not. 
Punishment is defined in terms of deterrence or retribution, and 
so the caveat may just restate the requirement of congruence: the 
deterrent and retributory effect must not be widely dispropor-
tionate to the stated regulatory aim. But the caveat may also ask 
whether the measures imposed simply look so much like what 
has traditionally been considered punishment that there is a par-
ticularly large burden to overcome by showing that they are not 
the thing they seem to be-and that is more like the third cate-
gory, that of acts, here an act of punishment.69 
63. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
64. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
65. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). 
66. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). 
67. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
68. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2142, quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249 
(1980). . . . . 
69. Perhaps the court in Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, constdered the tmposttton 
of loss of citizenship for draft evasion in this way. 
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III. IMPLICATIONS AND CONNECTIONS 
It should be apparent that the structural features of constitu-
tional doctrine I have elaborated are not merely a grammar of 
constitutional doctrine, neither constraining nor even guiding the 
substance of what that doctrine might be. It is not-to make an 
extreme analogy-a typography in which any words, sentences, 
and thoughts might be set. These structural features rather make 
possible certain distinctions and modes of conceptualization 
without which constitutional doctrine would be far less nuanced, 
and far more limited in the constraints and permissions it would 
express. Constitutional law limited to effects tests, for instance, 
would require that all constitutional values be implemented by 
balancing tests and this in turn would make court supervision of 
the implementation of those values far less appropriate and 
therefore less acceptable. It is only because constitutional values 
can be elaborated in more determinative constitutional doctrines 
that the subject seems the proper work for courts. Balancing is 
primarily for legislatures, doctrinal elaboration for courts. The 
structural features I have identified are among those that allow 
constitutional values to be articulated in constitutional doctrines. 
There are other recurring structural features that perform similar 
functions. The levels of scrutiny are another example, and I have 
shown some of the ways in which the effects/intents/acts trichot-
omy intersects with that structural feature. In this concluding 
part I indicate briefly how the trichotomy relates to several other 
features of constitutional doctrine. I indicate only those rela-
tions, and do not intend here a systematic survey of these fea-
tures of doctrine. The features I have chosen-the distinction 
between aspirational, institutional, and limiting norms; unconsti-
tutional conditions; and analogy-operate in different ways and 
at different levels of generality. That is why I have chosen them 
to suggest the complex relations between forms of argument in 
the elaboration of constitutional doctrine. 
A. ASPIRATIONS, INSTITUTIONS, LIMITS 
It is an instinct of lawyers to treat as the central example of 
law those rules requiring or forbidding conduct, what I call limit-
ing provisions. The most prominent legal positivists-a school of 
thought that attracts the reflexive allegiance of most lawyers-
even argued that such rules were the only examples of law "prop-
erly so called," to use John Austin's locutionJo That prejudice 
70. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the 
Study of Jurisprudence 2 (The Noonday Press, 1954). 
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was elegantly and definitively exploded by H.L.A. Hart, himself 
the leading modem positivist. He pointed out that many legal 
rules and doctrines establish institutions and set out ways of do-
ing things-making contracts or wills, transferring property, set-
ting up a corporation-in accordance with the rules of these 
institutions.71 Such rules are constitutive: they direct no particu-
lar action or forbearance; rather they establish frameworks for 
courses of conduct, and designate the offices and powers of vari-
ous actors. 
The Constitution, in its Preamble and perhaps in a few other 
places,n states aspirations for the new government it establishes 
and for its officers. But almost all of the text is given over to 
rules establishing and defining institutions and offices, and 
describing and limiting their powers. The aspirational provisions 
may then be seen as setting an interpretive context for these con-
stitutive and limiting provisions: the aspirational provisions ex-
plain their ultimate goal and so suggest a trajectory for the 
elaboration of doctrine based on these rules. Accustomed as we 
are to thinking of our Constitution as a strongly operational doc-
ument, we take for granted that aspirational provisions are rela-
tively few in the Constitution, but most constitutions are loaded 
with such provisions. These constitutions also promise rights to 
education, housing, health care, and employment. I call such 
provisions aspirational, because they state goals for government, 
but neither require particular actions or the observation of cer-
tain limits, nor create institutions or forces that structure the con-
duct of government, officials, or citizens. The most austere and 
influential statement of such aspirations is found in the constitu-
tion of the Federal Republic of Germany, stating that the Repub-
lic is a democratic and social federal state.73 
It is not surprising that the greatest part of our Constitution 
sets forth institutional rules of the constitutive sort. As I have 
argued elsewhere, the government of the United States that the 
Constitution proposes is a creation ex nihilo-not in the sense 
that it does not have antecedents, but rather in the strict juridical 
sense that those antecedents did not authorize the government 
71. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford U. Press, 1961). 
72. For example, Article I, section 8, clause 8 aims to "promote the progress of sci-
ence and useful arts;" Article II, section 3 urges that the "[President] shall take care that 
the Jaws are faithfully executed;" Article VI, clause 3 requires federal officers to take an 
oath to support the Constitution; and the Second Amendment justifies its grant of right 
by reference to "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary .... " I thank Akhil Amar for 
pointing this out to me. . . 
73. Federal Republic of Germany Const., Art. 20 (1). See DaVId P. Curne, The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 20-24 (U. of Chicago Press, 1994). 
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that replaced them.74 Many of the provisions limiting the powers 
of the offices and institutions of this newly established govern-
ment may from this perspective be seen not as prohibitions or 
injunctions but as provisions establishing, and marking the 
boundaries between, the offices and institutions so constituted. 
The way such provisions function in constitutional doctrine de-
pends on which perspective is taken. So for instance the Incom-
patibility clause, preventing legislators from being officers of the 
United States,7s while certainly a prohibition, serves to specify a 
particular structure of government, where-in contrast to a par-
liamentary system-the task of making the laws is assigned to 
persons and institutions distinct from those charged with their 
application and enforcement. The Bill of Attainder clause,76 
while a limitation and protection of the individual from govern-
ment, also distinguishes and defines the boundary between the 
legislative and the judicial powers, a distinction that did not ob-
tain for the Parliament which was an historical though not juridi-
cal antecedent of the legislature established in Article I. Even 
such quintessentially limiting provisions as the speech and reli-
gion clauses of the First Amendment, the Third Amendment's 
prohibition on quartering of soldiers, and the Fifth Amendment's 
grand jury clause have been reconceptualized by Akhil Amar as 
structural features of the distinct federal and state spheres of 
competence. 11 
The choice between these competing conceptualizations is 
critical in determining whether and how constitutional provisions 
will be enforced by the courts. When provisions are viewed as 
establishing institutions and offices they tend not to call forth the 
same degree of supervision by the courts as when those same 
provisions are seen as limitations. Examples are everywhere. In 
the matter of the separation of powers between the branches, the 
Bicameralism and Presentment clauses1s had traditionally been 
seen as setting up the way in which the Houses of Congress and 
the President are to go about their business, but in the Legislative 
Veto case (INS v. Chadha79) and the Gramm-Rudman case (Bow-
sher v. Synarso) these clauses took on the aspect of adjudicable 
74. See Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 
Harv. L. Rev. 13 (1995). 
75. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
76. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
77. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131 
(1991). 
78. U.S. Canst., Art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
79. 462 u.s. 919 (1983). 
80. 478 u.s. 714 (1986). 
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limits on what Congress might accomplish by their means, limits 
that in one case protected an individual from deportation and in 
the other (it might be said) Congress from itself. In the dormant 
commerce clause cases, the grant of power to Congress to regu-
late commerce among the statess1 becomes a limit on the power 
of states to burden or discriminate against such commerce, even 
without any exercise by Congress of the grant.s2 The statement 
in Article I, section 1 that the legislative power granted to Con-
gress is that which is granted "herein," which in appearance is an 
establishing and empowering provision, when taken together 
with the truism expressed by the Tenth Amendment that what is 
not granted to the national government is reserved to the states 
or the people (who else is there?), in Lopez v. United Statess3 and 
New York v. United States84 becomes, to an uncertain extent, an 
adjudicable and enforceable limit on national power to impinge 
on the prerogatives of state sovereignty. 
Thus constitutional law, as opposed to constitutional politics, 
is primarily a matter of limits. Aspirations cannot be enforced, 
and institutional arrangements either need not be (because they 
enforce themselves) or, if they can and are to be enforced, ap-
pear as limits. When the provisions of the Constitution are seen 
in this way as limiting provisions, the doctrine types I have been 
considering-such as the tripartite division between levels of 
scrutiny (strict, intermediate, and rational basis)-become rele-
vant. These levels of scrutiny assume the activity of the courts in 
enforcing these limits in a way that aspirational and institutional 
provisions do not require, and then go on to specify the degree of 
rigor with which a particular limit will be enforced. Indeed I 
would suggest that the greater the rigor of scrutiny (the more it 
approaches the strict) the more the limiting aspect of a provision 
is to the fore; conversely, a provision that attracts only rational 
basis scrutiny is seen as working largely in an institutional or as-
pirational way. And as I have also argued, this differentiation of 
levels of scrutiny in tum needs the act/intention/effects trichot-
omy to make it workable. 
B. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CoNDITIONS 
There are other argumentative elements that appear and re-
appear in a broad range of doctrines, and I do not intend to can-
vass them all here. One in particular, however-the 
81. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
82. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). 
83. 115 s. Cl. 1624 (1995) 
84. 112 s. Cl. 2408 (1992). 
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unconstitutional conditions problem-is so persistent and perva-
sive that I would like at least to suggest its relation to the analysis 
of doctrine I have offered. Oliver Wendell Holmes, as a state 
court judge, said that one may have a right to speak as he wishes 
but not as a policeman and not in a public park or public street.ss 
Since the government, in his view and as most thought at the 
time, had the widest latitude in its choice of employees or the 
uses it allowed of public property, it could condition its grant of 
those privileges on any ground it chose-including that the pro-
spective employee or soap box orator would not express views of 
which the government disapproved. The implications of this dic-
tum became intolerable as the range and importance of govern-
mentally provided benefits became more important, with the 
result that, if Holmes's doctrine stood, the enjoyment of constitu-
tional rights would be largely at the sufferance of the govern-
ment. And this conundrum exists not only at the level of 
individual right, but in the dealings of different branches and 
levels of government with each other. It appears wherever a unit 
of government would use a power to grant a benefit to another 
unit on the condition that that other unit exercise its governmen-
tal prerogatives in a way that the first has been granted no au-
thority to control. So, for instance, the regulation of alcoholic 
beverages is thought to have been made an exclusively state mat-
ter by the 1\venty-First Amendment (though the Amendment's 
text does not say so), while the national government has the 
broadest discretion to tax and distribute revenue. May it use that 
latter power to punish states that regulate the consumption of 
alcohol according to a different view of policy than that favored 
at the nationallevel?86 Before finding this technique fatally de-
fective, recall that Congress regularly pressures the President to 
exercise his various prerogatives-in foreign affairs, as Com-
mander-in-Chief, to make various appointments in the Executive 
branch-by threatening to withhold funds in more or less painful 
ways. 
This doctrine is embarrassed by a conundrum. The benefit 
could itself be promoted to the status of a constitutional right to 
avoid the problem, but then government would be constitution-
ally compelled to provide it, and provide it universally, even 
85. McAuliffe v. Mayor and Board of Alderman of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216 
(1892); Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510 (1895), aff'd sub nom, Davis v. Massachu-
setts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). 
86. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding statute conditioning 
receipt of highway funds on state's adoption of specified drinking age to be a valid use of 
Congress's spending power). 
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without the rights-pressuring (or any other) condition. As we 
have seen, there are not many instances of constitutionally man-
dated benefits (cells 1, 2, and 3): The government is obliged to 
provide a jury trial for those it wishes to prosecute for felonies, 
and so it may not condition that grant on the forfeiture of an-
other constitutional right. That bit of reasoning (doctrine frag-
ment) may be seen as a specification of the very act required: the 
provision of a jury trial to all, and if improperly conditioned it 
would not be provided to all, any more than if it were provided 
for a fee or only to every other defendant. The fact that the con-
dition required the forfeiture of another constitutional right 
would make such an incomplete compliance with the mandate 
even less acceptable. But this cannot provide a general solution 
to the problem of unconstitutional conditions, since that solution 
only obtains where the benefit government conditions on the re-
linquishing of a constitutional right is itself another constitutional 
right. As a general solution it would only do its work if we were 
prepared to constitutionalize the entitlement to most of the bene-
fits government provides. 
If the guarantee of free speech is seen in terms of inten-
tions-that suppressing a disfavored point of view cannot figure 
among the reasons government may offer to justify its actions-
then the question will be whether the conditioning of a benefit 
on refraining from certain speech can be explained apart from 
this forbidden purpose. And that is an inquiry similar to the one 
meant to be assisted by such doctrine fragments as the least re-
strictive alternative test and content neutrality. By contrast, 
Congress pressuring the President-or the President pressuring 
Congress-by the exercise of their respective powers may be 
seen not under the category of limiting norms at all but of consti-
tutive norms, establishing institutions and offices and defining 
their powers. In this perspective the purposes for which those 
powers are used does not come into issue, but only whether pro-
cedures have been observed and formal correctness complied 
with. Cast in these terms, the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine fragment fits into a wide variety of more fully elaborated 
specific doctrines: about freedom of speech and access to a range 
of governmentally controlled forums, free exercise of religion, 
dormant commerce clause, regulatory takings of property, and 
even the interrelation between the power of the federal govern-
ment to spend money and the right of the states to regulate mat-
ters relating to the consumption of alcohol. 
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C. ANALOGY 
A conceptualization of limits that regards acts along with ef-
fects and intents may help to explain the prevalence-and estab-
lish the legitimacy-of analogical reasoning in legal/judicial 
argument. The constitutional norms that spell limits, I have sug-
gested, sometimes best display their character as norms that des-
ignate kinds of acts as forbidden or mandatory. I have given the 
example of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment: it 
designates an act the meaning (not intention, not effect) of which 
is an endorsement of religion. Other limiting provisions can be 
read this way without even a struggle. The various provisions of 
the Bill of Rights having to do with criminal procedure describe 
performances that must be enacted in certain ways and not in 
other ways. Such a conception of constitutional limits produces 
doctrines of a distinctive sort. They call to mind a paradigm or 
set of paradigms which represent the forbidden or required act 
and from which doctrine then builds outward by inclusion and 
analogy. The use of analogy is troubling and even scandalous to 
a certain kind of rationalism, which looks to abstractions and 
general principles and finds analogy unduly episodic, impression-
istic, and unsystematic. Yet analogy is central to common law 
adjudication, and I suggest one reason is that many legal norms 
designate acts and types of acts, rather than categories of conse-
quences or intentions, and the most natural way to operate with 
such norms without betraying their specific character is by the 
method of analogy. 
Now analogy need not be wholly intuitive and conclusory. 
Acts can be identified as having certain characteristics, and these 
characteristics are what lead us to draw the analogy between an 
established instance and a new one to which the concept is ap-
plied.B7 And lurking behind this process of extension and limita-
tion in analogy are indeed assumptions about purposes (I) and 
effects (E): two things seem similar (analogous) against the back-
ground of what they do for us and why we care about them. But 
it is a mistake to see analogy as just a shorthand way of analyzing 
instances in terms of their effects, and assigning them to one or 
another category on that basis. The process, rather, is similar to 
the one in which we decide whether to extend a name (lion, cat, 
comedian) to a new instance. We may do this by analogy-it 
looks more like a cat than it does anything else-or more rigor-
ously by the slow development of necessary and sufficient condi-
87. See Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational 
Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 923 (19%). 
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tions for inclusion and exclusion. But this latter method is only 
apparently more rigorous than the first. We may adjust the crite-
ria as we apply them, and so it is the analogy that is doing the 
work and the designation of criteria only cleans up afterwards. If 
our background concerns about purposes and effects are impli-
cated as we go about the work of analogy, it is as much to change 
our commitments as we acknowledge new analogies as it is to 
govern the analogies by fixed commitments about purposes and 
effects. This is another way of putting the point-which so em-
barrasses formal decision theory and economics-that there are 
processes of value-formation and value development and that 
these cannot, without circularity, be assimilated to analysis ac-
cording to fixed norms of valuation. What we care about 
changes, and analogy is the best account of the processes of that 
change. Analogy works more like a narrative than a formal de-
duction from general principles or an induction to general princi-
ples.ss And analogical reasoning may be seen as a kind of 
performance parallel to that process. 
And more generally, to the extent that doctrine is constitu-
tive of a way of doing things, rather than prescriptive of an end 
point to be attained or avoided, compliance with it is most aptly 
judged by looking to whether government's behavior comports 
with the model the doctrine constitutes: fair procedure becomes 
a complex performance and due process asks whether its steps 
have been followed. The force of many such constitutional 
norms is lost if they are looked at principally as stating abstract 
values (e.g., fairness) to be maximized-even if such a value 
stands, abstractly, in the background. Such performance norms 
are most aptly viewed as acts-extended acts, actions-in the ty-
pology I offer here, and they are elaborated by the method of 
analogy. The method of analogy is peculiarly apt to doctrines 
cast in terms of acts, because of the demonstrative or exemplary 
nature of such doctrines. 
88. See Fried, 108 Harv. L. Rev. (cited in note 45}. 
